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Abstract 
 A worrying number of psychological findings have turned out to not be replicable. Diagnoses of the 
causes of this "replication crisis", and recommendations to address it, have nearly exclusively focused 
on methods of data collection, analysis, and reporting. We argue that a further cause of poor 
replicability is the often weak logical link between theories and their empirical tests. We propose a 
distinction between discovery-oriented and theory-testing research. In discovery-oriented research, 
theories do not strongly imply hypotheses by which they can be tested, but rather define a search 
space for the discovery of effects that would support them. Failures to find these effects do not 
question the theory. This endeavor necessarily engenders a high risk of Type-I errors, that is, 
publication of findings that will not replicate. Theory-testing research, by contrast, relies on theories 
that strongly imply hypotheses, such that disconfirmation of the hypothesis provides evidence 
against the theory. Theory-testing research engenders a smaller risk of Type-I errors. A strong link 
between theories and hypotheses is best achieved by formalizing theories as computational models. 
We critically revisit recommendations for addressing the "replication crisis", including the proposal to 
distinguish exploratory from confirmatory research, and the preregistration of hypotheses and 
analysis plans.  
 
Keywords: Replication, Scientific Inference, Hypothesis Testing, Computational Modeling, 
Preregistration 
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Psychology has a problem. Over the past decade it has become clear that many findings, 
among them some deemed well established, are not replicable (Marsman et al., 2017; Open-Science-
Collaboration, 2015). Numerous recommendations have been made for how to address this 
"replication crisis" (Asendorpf et al., 2013; Munafò et al., 2017).  Virtually all these recommendations 
pertain to our methods of data collection, analysis, and publication. Here we argue that, in addition 
to poor methods, the replication crisis is also due to the prevalence of theories that have only a weak 
logical relation to the hypotheses through which they are evaluated empirically. We suggest that the 
replication crisis is best resolved by focusing attention on the role of theorizing, and we do not 
believe that current recommendations that focus entirely on data generation are sufficient to 
overcome the crisis. To help clarify our argument, we summarize the intended meaning of some key 
terms in Table 1.  
 
Figure 1: Two levels of scientific inference. On the theory level, theories imply hypotheses. Hypotheses 
may be confirmed as empirical generalizations. Empirical generalizations support or question 
theories, depending on whether they match or mismatch the hypotheses derived from them. On the 
empirical level, empirical generalizations imply expectations for data from individual studies. Data 
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Table 1: Terminology 
Term Notation Definition 
Theory T An integrated set of propositions about latent (not 
directly observable) mechanisms, processes, and 
variables, and their causal relations to each other and 
to manifest (observable) variables 
(Formal) Model T A theory that is formalized, so that hypotheses can be 
derived from it through automatic derivation (e.g., 
logical proof, mathematical proof, or computer 
simulation) 
Inferential Link (none) The relation between a set of premises (e.g., a theory) 
and a conclusion (e.g., a hypothesis). Inferential links 
vary in strength. Strength of an inferential link can be 
defined by how many auxiliary assumptions must be 
added as further premises to render the link deductive, 
and how credible these auxiliary assumptions are.  
Empirical 
Generalization 
X, Y, Z A statement describing a phenomenon, that is, an 
empirical regularity that holds generally, that is, for all 
members of a defined population, across a set of – not 
always well defined – situations, and across time 
Hypothesis X, Y, Z The assumption that an empirical generalization holds 
Prediction X, Y, Z An expectation of an empirical generalization not yet 
established by data (i.e., an expectation formulated a 
priori) 
Explanation (none) An empirical generalization is explained by a theory to 
the degree that there exists a strong inferential link 
from the theory to the hypothesis that the empirical 
generalization must hold.  
Observation, Data "x", "y", "z" The result of a single study supporting X, Y, and Z, 
respectively.  




P(X|T)/P(X|¬T) Diagnosticity of the confirmation of a hypothesis X  for 
theory T (i.e., increase in credibility of theory T) 
Disconfirmatory 
diagnosticity 
P(¬X|T)/P(¬X|¬T) Diagnosticity of the disconfirmation of a hypothesis X 
for theory T (i.e., decrease in credibility of theory T) 
 
Scientific reasoning relies on inferences on two levels (see Figure 1). On the first, the 
empirical level, we link hypotheses (e.g., X, Y, Z) to data (e.g., "x", "y", "z"). Most of our elaborate 
tools of inferential statistics serve to formalize the inductive inference from data to hypotheses: To 
the extent that an effect observed in a sample is significant (in classic null-hypothesis testing) or 
supported by a strong Bayes factor (in Bayesian statistical inference), we gain confidence that the 
effect is real; that is, that it holds in the population from which we drew the sample. Credible 
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hypotheses are empirical generalizations: Systematic relationships between variables that we believe 
to hold in the population – for instance, the Stroop effect (MacLeod, 1991), or the correlation 
between working-memory capacity and fluid intelligence (Conway, Kane, & Engle, 2003). The 
inductive inference from data to empirical generalizations is mirrored by a deductive inference: If an 
empirical generalization holds, we can predict that we will observe it whenever we test it with an 
appropriate study design. In other words, if an effect is real, we expect that we will be able to 
replicate it.  
On a second level of inference, the theoretical level, we use theories (T) to derive 
hypotheses– often referred to as predictions1 – which claim that some empirical generalizations X, Y, 
or Z are real. Established empirical generalizations, in turn, license inferences about theories, 
supporting them if they match the hypotheses derived from them, and questioning them if not.  
As most of the method development in psychology focuses on formalizing the inductive 
inference on the empirical level, it is perhaps not surprising that much of the discussion on the 
causes of the replication crisis, and how to fix it, also concentrates on that level: Underpowered 
studies (Button et al., 2013), deficiencies of null-hypothesis significance testing (Wagenmakers, 
2007), p-hacking (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011), and publication bias (Ferguson & Heene, 
2012) have been cited as reasons for the  limited credibility of empirical generalizations we infer 
from data. There is much value in those critical reflections on this branch of the scientific reasoning 
cycle. At the same time, we argue that too little attention has been paid to weaknesses of our 
inferences on the theory level (for two commendable exceptions see Fiedler, 2017; Muthukrishna & 
Henrich, 2019). We argue that those weaknesses at the theory level also contribute to the replication 
crisis.  
                                                            
1 The term prediction has the connotation of foreseeing future events. Therefore, we use the term hypothesis 
for a statement of an empirical generalization inferred from a theory regardless of whether that statement is 
formulated before or after the empirical generalization has been established; we reserve the term prediction 
for the more limited case of hypotheses about empirical generalizations not yet known.  
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Discovery-Oriented Research and Theory-Testing Research 
To illuminate the problem, we outline the steps that are often involved in generating results 
that turn out to be non-replicable. Step 1: Start from a theory that implies that a certain class of 
phenomena can be observed under some circumstances. For instance, take a theory of embodiment 
priming that we put forward to illustrate our case. We imbue the theory with the following core 
assumptions: (1) All abstract concepts are grounded in bodily states, sensations, or movements. (2) 
Experimentally inducing the bodily state, sensation, or movement in which a given concept is 
grounded activates (primes) that concept. (3) The activated concept influences behavior related to 
that concept.2 This theory entails the hypothesis that inducing a state, sensation, or movement can 
lead to biases in judgments and decisions that depend on the concepts primed by this state, 
sensation, or movement.  
Empirically testing this hypothesis involves search in a very large search space: There are 
many abstract concepts; for each of them, there are many ways in which it could be grounded in 
bodily states, sensations, and movements, and for each such presumed embodiment there are 
numerous ways in which it can be experimentally induced. Moreover, for each abstract concept 
there are judgments or decisions potentially influenced by it that one could investigate for the 
predicted bias. The combination of all these possibilities constitutes the space of possible tests of the 
Embodiment Priming Theory (EPT). For instance, researchers could test the hypothesis that having 
people turn kitchen-paper rolls clockwise (as opposed to anti-clockwise) activates their orientation 
towards the future, thereby priming the concept of novelty, so that they score higher on the 
personality scale "openness to experience" (Topolinski & Sparenberg, 2012). Or researchers could 
test whether people who are asked to briefly hold a cup of hot coffee subsequently rate another 
person as more "warm" compared to people who held a cup of cold coffee (Williams & Bargh, 2008).  
                                                            
2 Whereas our Embodiment Priming Theory is inspired by several sources (e.g., Jostmann, Lakens, & Schubert, 
2009; Körner, Topolinski, & Strack, 2015), we do not ascribe it to any particular author because it is meant to be 
a rational reconstruction of contemporary ideas rather than a faithful expression of one specific author's 
writing.  
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The theory does not imply that the predicted bias will occur for each possible test in that 
space – it merely predicts that it occurs in some, arguably small, subset of possible tests. As a 
consequence, each individual test that confirms the predicted bias counts as evidence for the theory, 
but each individual test failing to show the predicted bias does not count as evidence against it – it 
merely shows that this particular combination of a concept, its assumed grounding, the chosen 
manipulation, and the chosen judgment is not an informative test of the theory. In that case, instead 
of revising the theory, researchers need to ask "what went wrong" with their study: They might have 
chosen the wrong judgment or decision as dependent variable; they might have made the wrong 
assumptions about how exactly the concept in question is embodied, or they might have failed to 
induce the relevant bodily state. In any case, it is reasonable for the researcher to dismiss such a 
failure as uninformative, and move on to another spot in the search space.  
It might be tempting to dismiss this kind of research as flawed – especially in light of the fact 
that the examples cited above did not hold up in replication attempts (Lynott et al., 2014; 
Wagenmakers et al., 2015) – but that would be unjustified. Many respectable and useful research 
programs follow the same rationale, such as the search for exoplanets, the search for new drugs, or, 
closer to home, the search for neural correlates of a psychological phenomenon. We can call this 
endeavor discovery-oriented research.3 What makes this kind of research generate non-replicable 
results is the second step in the sequence: Conduct an extensive search through the vast space of 
possible tests; carry out each test only once; and evaluate the evidence from each test by the 
conventional standards of statistical inference (e.g., a p-value < 0.05) (Pashler & Harris, 2012). Those 
inferential standards were, however, designed for a different kind of endeavor, which we will call 
theory-testing research.  
To explain the difference, we characterize the two kinds of research formally. We will use T 
for the theory in question, X for an empirical generalization that can be stated as a testable 
hypothesis (i.e., the proposition that a certain experimental effect or correlation exists in the 
                                                            
3 We borrow the term discovery-oriented from Ioannidis (2005) 
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population), and "x" as evidence from an individual study supporting hypothesis X (e.g., an 
experiment yielding a significant effect as expected from X). Table 2 presents all equations and a 
numerical example. Table 3 presents the corresponding equations for the case where a study yields 
disconfirming evidence "¬x" that speaks against hypothesis X.   
Table 2: Equations for Inferences, with Examples for Discovery-Oriented and Theory-Testing Research 
Term Equation Discovery-Oriented Theory-Testing 
Theory Level 
Prior of theory being 
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Likelihood of 
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Table 3: Equations for Inferences from Disconfirming Evidence 
 Term Equation Discovery-Oriented Theory-Testing 
Empirical Level 
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.2*.6 / (.2*.6 + 
.95 * .4) = .24 













+¬=¬  .83 * .01 + .48 * .99 
= .48 
.83 * .24 + 0 = 
.20 
 




In discovery-oriented research, the theory motivating it implies the existence of phenomena 
in a broad class Ω, of which X is an instance. For example, the Embodiment Priming Theory implies 
that the phenomenon of priming of abstract concepts through bodily states, sensations, or 
movements exists. The theory does not specify under which conditions this phenomenon will be 
observed – it merely motivates the search for it. Each test of that general expectation tests a specific 
hypothesis X, for instance, that people's scores on an "openness for experience" questionnaire will 
increase after they have rotated kitchen rolls in a clockwise direction. However, the theory implies no 
more than that a small subset of possible hypotheses X out of Ω are actually true (i.e., they describe 
real effects). In other words, for any given X, P(X|T) is small – to give a numerical example, let's say 
P(X|T) = 0.1. Confirming X as an empirical generalization is still diagnostic, supporting theory T, as 
Theory Crisis | 10 
 
long as the probability of such an effect being real, assuming the theory is false, is much lower, say 
P(X|¬T) = 0.02. These are the values we assume in the numerical example in Table 2. Note that in this 
example, we assume that the confirmatory diagnosticity of X for T (as defined in Table 1; it can be 
computed as the ratio of the first two rows in Table 2) is equal in the discovery-oriented and the 
theory-testing cases because we want to compare them free of confounds with unjustified 
differences. We do the same for other parameters, such as P(T), the prior probability that the theory 
is true.  
Taken together, in discovery-oriented research the probability that X is a true hypothesis is 
low, regardless of whether T is true or not:  
)()()()()( TPT|XPTPT|XPXP ¬¬+= . 
Assuming equal priors for our theory to be true or not, P(T) = P(¬T) = 0.5, then P(X) = 0.06 
(see Table 2). In other words, phenomena of the kind predicted by our theory have a low base rate of 
occurrence. Therefore, success in the search for these phenomena is sometimes hailed as 
demonstrating surprising, "counterintuitive" effects, with the added benefit of attracting attention 
and headlines.  
If X is a true hypothesis, we can expect that a well-designed study provides evidence for it—
which we call “x”—with reasonably high probability, for instance P("x"|X) = 0.8. If X is false, there is 
still a chance that evidence supporting it is obtained due to sampling error and measurement error, 
say P("x"|¬X) = 0.05. The values we assigned to these two conditional probabilities are for illustrative 
purposes only, but they are not chosen arbitrarily. In the framework of null-hypothesis significance 
testing, P("x"|X) is the statistical power of a study, 1-β, and P("x"|¬X) is the criterion for significance, 
α, which sets the expected rate of false positives. The values 0.8 and 0.05 are representative of the 
power that is often recommended, and the conventional Type-I error rate, respectively. 
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We can now use Bayes' rule to calculate the probability that a study yielding evidence "x" 








The implications of Bayes' rule are easy to grasp when working through an example in 
frequency formats (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995): With the probabilities given above, out of 100 
tests of our theory T – each testing a different hypothesis X out of the theory's search space – we can 
expect 6 to test a true effect, because P(X) = 0.06. Assuming P("x"|X) = 0.8, we can expect around 5 
of them to provide evidence "x" for the effect. Of the remaining 94 tests aimed at non-existing 
effects, we must expect approximately 5 to yield evidence "x" due to the false-positive rate P("x"|¬X) 
= 0.05 (we report rounded results in the text to facilitate exposition whereas Table 2 contains results 
expressed to the second decimal digit). Hence, the proportion of true effects out of those tests that 
yielded evidence for an effect is around 5/10. In general, the lower the base rate P(X), the higher the 
posterior probability that an observation "x" speaking in favor of an effect is a false positive (Fiedler, 
2017; Ioannidis, 2005; Miller, 2009).  
Theory-testing research 
Now, consider theory-testing research. This kind of research starts from a theory that 
provides strong inferential links for deriving hypotheses. Whereas a theory that is guiding discovery 
implies that X in Ω can be the case, a theory suitable for theory-testing research implies that, under 
conditions specified in the theory, X must be the case. Take, for example, a temporal-context theory 
of episodic memory such as SIMPLE (Brown, Neath, & Chater, 2007). This theory implies that 
extending the (filled or unfilled) delay between encoding and retrieval reduces the temporal 
distinctiveness of events (such as words in a memory list), which necessarily reduces the chance of 
accurate retrieval.4 This hypothesis follows deductively from the core assumptions of temporal-
                                                            
4 Assuming the words are still presented at the same rate.  
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context theories; in the case of SIMPLE, which formalizes these assumptions by a set of equations, 
they can be derived mathematically. This tight logical link between theory and hypothesis implies 
that establishing X as an empirical generalization speaks in favor of theory T, and conversely, 
empirically establishing that X is not true counts as evidence against T (e.g., see Lewandowsky, 
Duncan, & Brown, 2004; for evidence against the prediction from SIMPLE mentioned above). This is 
why we call this kind of research theory testing: It offers a chance to obtain strong evidence both in 
favor and against a theory.  
Ideally, the hypothesis follows deductively from the theory, such that P(X|T) = 1. For 
confirmation of X to be diagnostic (see Table 1), we hope that P(X|¬T) << 1 (in the example in Table 2 
we set this value to 0.2, the same value as for discovery-oriented research). Now the prior probability 
of X is at a minimum equal to the prior of the theory. As long as the theory has a reasonably high 
prior – meaning that it is not highly implausible to begin with –  this implies a fairly high base rate of 
hypothesis X. Assuming P(T) = 0.5 (the same value as for our discovery-oriented example), with 
P(X|T) = 1 and P(X|¬T) = 0.2, we obtain P(X) =0.6 (see Table 2). This means we can expect that out of 
100 tests of hypotheses that share the assumed characteristics of X, 60 are true. Of these, given our 
presumed power of 0.8, we can expect 48 to be supported by evidence "x". Of the remaining 40, we 
expect 2 to yield false positives. Hence, the posterior probability that an observation "x" reflects a 
true effect is 48/50 or 0.96.  
Obviously, real cases are rarely that ideal, and the inferential link between theory T and 
hypothesis X is often less than perfect, so that P(X|T) < 1. We should therefore think of the 
distinction between discovery-oriented and theory-testing research as a continuum that varies with 
the strength of the inferential link from T to X; here we focus on its extremes to clarify the 
distinction, and we show how the probabilities of interest vary as we vary P(X|T) continuously in 
Figure 2. The left panel of Figure 2 shows how the prior probability of a hypothesis, P(X), increases 
with the strength of the inferential link, P(X|T). The figure also shows the implications of that prior 
for the posterior probability of the hypothesis when supported by data, P(X|"x"), and in light of 
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contradictory evidence, P(X|"¬x"), based on the equations and assumed parameters in Tables 2 and 
3, respectively. Discovery-oriented research corresponds to values on the left of the x-axis, near zero, 
whereas theory-testing research corresponds to values nearer 1. The right panel of Figure 2 shows 
how the two possible outcomes of a study ("x" or "not x") translate into the posterior probability of 
the theory being true, P(T|"x") and P(T|"¬x"), respectively, as a function of P(X|T). This plot shows 
how, as the logical link between theory and hypothesis becomes stronger, we learn more from both 
possible outcomes: If the data support the hypothesis, they provide stronger evidence for the theory, 
so that P(T|"x") rises more above the theory's prior, P(T) = 0.5 (indicated by the horizontal red line). 
Perhaps more striking is the pattern of P(T|"¬x"), showing that evidence against the hypothesis 
becomes increasingly informative (i.e., moving the posterior of the theory away from its prior) as 
P(X|T) becomes larger. We can use the disconfirmatory diagnosticity – that is, the informativeness of 
failed hypothesis tests (see bottom row of Table 1) — as the key criterion for placing a research 
endeavor on the continuum between discovery-oriented and theory-testing research by asking: To 
what extent does disconfirmation of a hypothesis derived from the theory count as evidence against 
the theory?  
To conclude, applying conventional criteria of evidence for an effect, such as α = 0.05 and 1-β 
= 0.8, results in an arguably tolerable false-positive rate in the context of theory-testing research, but 
in a clearly unacceptable false-positive rate in the context of discovery-oriented research. Obviously, 
false positives are typically not replicable. One reason for the replication crisis in psychology, we 
suspect, is that a large part of psychological research is discovery-oriented, but uses evidentiary 
criteria that are suited for theory-testing research but are far too lax for discovery-oriented research.  
For these reasons, the focus of the contemporary discussion on how to address the 
"replication crisis" by reducing the chance of Type-I errors, or "false positives", is entirely justified for 
discovery-oriented research. Researchers engaging in theory-testing research, by contrast, should be 
more concerned with fully exploiting the evidence in the data. In particular, they should be 
concerned as much with establishing that a hypothesis is false as with establishing that it is true. The 
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specific strength of theory-testing research is that we can leverage the disconfirmation of a 
hypothesis as evidence against any theory that entails it (right panel in Figure 2). To make full use of 
this high disconfirmatory diagnosticity, we need methods to establish that a hypothesis is false. Null-
hypothesis significance testing does not provide the tools for that purpose – we can at best fail to 
provide evidence against the null hypothesis. Bayesian model comparison, by contrast, enables 
researchers to gauge the evidence both for the alternative hypothesis—as with conventional 
frequentist statistics—and also—unlike frequentist statistics—for the null hypothesis (Wagenmakers, 
Marsman, et al., 2018).  
We now discuss some of the proposed remedies for the replication crisis within the 
framework of the two levels of inference. We explore the limitations of those remedies before 
turning to sketching a way forward that emphasizes the development of stronger theories over 
improvements to data collection and analysis.   
Proposed Remedies for the Replication Crisis 
Many remedies have been proposed to address the replication crisis, among them: (1) More 
stringent statistical standards for inferring that an observed effect is real (Benjamin et al., 2018). (2) 
High-powered direct replications using the exact same materials and protocol as the original study, 
preferentially distributed across many labs to ensure generalization (e.g., Wagenmakers et al., 2016). 
(3) Open data, open materials, and open analysis algorithms. (4) A clear distinction between 
hypotheses formulated a priori (before looking at the data) and those formulated a posteriori – 
sometimes referred to as HARKing (Hypothesizing After Results are Known; Kerr, 1998) – and, 
relatedly, a clear distinction between exploratory and confirmatory research (Wagenmakers, Dutilh, 
& Srafoglou, 2018; Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, van der Maas, & Kievit, 2012). (5) 
Preregistration of the hypotheses, the data collection plan (in particular, stopping rules for data 
collection), and the analysis plan to limit the "researcher degrees of freedom" (Simmons et al., 2011) 
in hypothesis formulation and in making analytical choices that invite HARKing and p-hacking, 
respectively.   
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Many of these proposals are helpful ideas for raising the standards of good research practice, 
primarily ensuring more trustworthy inferences on the empirical level of scientific inference – the 
level connecting observations to empirical generalizations (Figure 1). Our concern is that shoring up 
the strength of inferences on the empirical level does not by itself address deficits on the theory level 
– the level connecting empirical generalizations to theories. As we show next, the recommendations 
presently discussed are either irrelevant to the theory level or even misleading about it.  
More Stringent Statistical Standards and Direct Replication 
An obvious remedy to reduce the rate of false positives is to raise the bar for declaring a 
discovery. An impressive line-up of scholars recently proposed to re-define statistical significance as a 
p-value < 0.005 (Benjamin et al., 2018). Adopting a stricter criterion reduces false positives but also 
true positives, unless the loss of power is compensated for by an increase in sample size. Is this worth 
the price? Returning to our numerical examples: When a discovery-oriented research endeavor starts 
with a low prior probability of an effect, P(X) = 0.06, then setting α to 0.005 reduces the false-positive 
rate from 5 out of 94 to 0.5 out of 94, and assuming we invest the necessary resources to maintain 
power at 0.8 (i.e., through increasing the typical sample size by 70%, see Benjamin et al., 2018), we 
can still expect about 5 out of 100 true positive results. This means that the proportion of true 
positives among all positives becomes a reasonably acceptable 5 out of 5.5 (or 91%), a large 
improvement over the 5/10 (50%) we had with α = 0.05. In the case of theory-testing research, 
starting from P(X) = 0.5, we reduce the false positives from 2 to 0.2 out of 40. Again keeping power at 
0.8, we can expect to improve the proportion of true positives among all positives from 48/50 (96%) 
to 48/48.2 (99%). Unless false positives have very high practical costs, this is arguably a negligible 
improvement, hardly worth the extra cost (see also Fiedler, Kutzner, & Krueger, 2012). Figure 3 
summarizes the effects of reducing α on the posteriors of the hypothesis (left panel) and the 
posterior of the theory that entails it (right panel) after obtaining a significant result supporting the 
hypothesis. The figure shows that discovery-oriented research stands much to gain from reducing α – 
theory-testing research not so much.  
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Figure 3: Effects of reducing the alpha level for obtaining evidence "x" in favor of a hypothesis X by 
rejecting the null hypothesis (Simulations based on values in Table 2, varying alpha). With more 
stringent alpha levels the posterior of both the hypothesis (left panel) and the theory that entails it 
(right panel) after obtaining a significant result "x" increase. For discovery-oriented research, this 
increase is steeper because the hypothesis starts from a lower prior. 
 
An analogous argument holds for direct replications. A single reasonably well-powered study 
conducted as part of discovery-oriented research tests a hypothesis with a low prior probability, and 
therefore empirical support for the hypothesis returns only a modest posterior probability for it – in 
our numerical example above (and in Table 2), that posterior would be P(X|"x") = 5/10. In that case, 
direct replication is indispensable to gain a reasonable level of confidence that X is a real effect. In 
contrast, when the same study is carried out as part of a theory-testing endeavor, we start with a 
higher prior, and therefore obtain a higher posterior – in our numerical example, P(X|"x") = 48/50. A 
successful direct replication would still increase the posterior further, but not by much. The 
resources for a second study might therefore be better invested for testing a second hypothesis 
derived from the same theory.  
Table 4 presents the equations for calculating the posterior probability of T, given "x1" 
followed by a successful replication, "x2", in comparison to the posterior of T, given "x1" followed by 
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this new prediction, P(Y|T) and P(Y|¬T), are assumed to be the same as those for X. For the 
numerical example illustrating theory-testing research, the posterior after replication, P(T|"x1"+"x2") 
= .83, whereas the posterior after successful test of a second prediction, P(T|"x1"+"y") = .94. Note 
that for the example illustrating discovery-oriented research, by contrast, the direct replication yields 
not only a substantially increased posterior of X but also a slightly larger posterior of T than the test 
of a new prediction (.81 vs. .79). Figure 4 shows that this is a general result that holds regardless of 
the prior of the theory.  
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Figure 4: Posterior of theory T, given data from an initial finding "x1" confirming hypothesis X, and 
either a replication of that finding, "x2", or data "y" confirming a second hypothesis, Y.   
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We explored the issue further with Figure 5, which plots the advantage (or disadvantage, if 
negative) of direct replication compared to testing a second hypothesis, defined as the difference in 
the posterior of the theory achieved after two experiments. Here we varied P(X|T) continuously, 
rather than focusing on the two extreme ends – discovery-oriented vs. theory-testing research – and 
in addition varied the confirmatory diagnosticity of the hypothesis, that is, the ratio of P(X|T) to 
P(X|¬T). Figure 5 shows that, with the majority of constellations explored here, a successful test of a 
second hypothesis yields more evidence for the theory than a successful direct replication (i.e., most 
data points fall below the zero line, indicating that a direct replication was less beneficial than testing 
a second hypothesis). 
 
Figure 5: Advantage of Replication, defined as P(T|"x1" & x2") – P(T|"x1" & "y"). Each line represents 
one level of P(X|T), and the x-axis represents the log of the confirmatory diagnosticity of the tested 
hypothesis. Confirmatory diagnosticity, defined as P(X|T)/P(X|¬T), was varied over values [1, 2, 3, 5, 
10, 20 50]; We set the diagnosticity equal for both X and Y, so the x-axis represents log(P(X|T) / 
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Specifically, whenever the links between theory and hypotheses, P(X|T) and P(Y|T), are at 
least moderately strong, or the confirmatory diagnosticity of the hypotheses is medium to low, then 
the theory stands to gain more support from a successful test of a second hypothesis derived from it 
than by a successful direct replication of the first test. In the figure, this refers to values below the 
red lines, which cluster towards the left (lower diagnosticity) and involve stronger links between 
theory and hypotheses (higher values of P(X|T); see legend). The exception is the test of highly 
"counterintuitive" hypotheses typical for discovery-oriented research: This kind of hypothesis is not 
derived from the theory but merely motivated by it, so P(X|T) is low, and at the same time the 
hypothesis is highly diagnostic, because if the theory were false, its prior probability would be close 
to zero. As a result, its overall prior is very low, so it has much to gain from direct replication. This 
corresponds to values above the red lines in the figure, which arise with high diagnosticity and low 
values of P(X|T) only. 
All this is not to say that direct replications are useless. Obviously, when our goal is to 
establish whether or not an empirical generalization for which we have initial evidence is real, then 
direct replication of the initial study is the only way to achieve that. As long as our focus is on 
establishing reliable facts at the empirical level, direct replication remains the gold standard. When 
our primary interest is with establishing which theories are credible, however, we find that often 
testing new hypotheses to evaluate a theory—provided the theory strongly implies the hypotheses—
is a better investment of our resources than a direct replication.   
"Exploratory" and "Confirmatory" Research Revisited 
 A further common recommendation to address the replication crisis is to clearly distinguish 
between exploratory and confirmatory research, with an understanding that only the latter can 
provide strong evidence for a hypothesis (Wagenmakers, Dutilh, et al., 2018; Wagenmakers et al., 
2012). This recommendation is usually coupled with the appeal to preregister hypotheses and 
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analysis plans. The distinction between exploratory and confirmatory research is perhaps reminiscent 
of our distinction between discovery-oriented and theory-testing research introduced above, but the 
exploratory-confirmatory contrast is usually defined in a different and, we argue, unhelpful way. 
Research is regarded as confirmatory if and only if hypotheses and data analysis plan are fixed before 
looking at the data, whereas hypotheses and analysis decisions that are chosen after looking at the 
data, and perhaps in response to characteristics of the data, count as exploratory. Exploratory 
research is criticized for being vulnerable to intentional or unintentional confirmation bias: When the 
data inform which hypothesis to test, or which combination of data transformation and statistical 
analysis procedure to choose, then researchers keen on finding reportable effects are tempted to 
choose hypotheses and analysis plans likely to yield confirmation of an expected effect. A related 
argument is the critique of HARKing (Hypothesizing After the Results are Known), the practice of 
presenting a post-hoc hypothesis that was formulated after looking at the data as if it were an a-
priori hypothesis that has been formulated before looking at the data (Kerr, 1998).  
This critique is certainly valid. What we find unhelpful about it is its emphasis on the 
temporal order in which a researcher specifies their hypothesis and analysis plan on the one hand, 
and interrogates the data on the other (see also Rubin, 2017b, for a similar critique). Fixing 
hypotheses and analysis plans before analyzing the data is regarded as good practice; reversing the 
order is considered bad practice. Preregistration is argued to address the problem because it 
enforces the right temporal order of these actions. This way of framing the problem and the solution 
remains superficial because it uses a distinction that does not matter – temporal order – as a proxy 
for one that does matter – the distinction between justified and arbitrary choices of hypotheses and 
analysis procedures.  
The question whether temporal order matters in establishing the validity of hypotheses or 
theories is known as the paradox of predictivism in philosophy of science (Barnes, 2008). The paradox 
arises from a contradiction between two strong intuitions. One is that a theory receives stronger 
confirmation from the prediction of a novel finding – not known to the theorist at the time of 
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formulating the theory – than from the explanation of an already known finding. The other intuition 
is that the evidential value of a finding for a theory should not depend on historical accidents such as 
when a theorist first learned about an empirical finding relative to when she first thought of a theory 
that predicts or explains that finding. The notion that the history of the researcher's state of mind 
should determine to what degree some piece of empirical evidence supports a given theory is 
generally regarded as unacceptable in the philosophy of science. To appreciate why, consider the 
following scenarios: 
Scenario A: Researcher A designs the following test of the Embodiment Priming Theory (EPT) 
sketched above: A sample of participants is divided randomly into two groups. Upon entering the 
laboratory, members of the experimental group are asked to leap over a gap in the floor; members 
of the control group are tested in a second lab that is identical to the first except that there is no gap 
to cross. Researcher A reasons that the activity of the experimental group primes the concept of a 
"leap of faith", and therefore this group should, on average, score higher on a subsequent religiosity 
questionnaire than the control group. Researcher A preregisters this prediction, together with a 
straightforward t-test as analysis plan, then runs the experiment, and finds a significant effect in the 
expected direction.  
Scenario B: Researcher B runs an experiment on paired-associates memory: Participants 
encode lists of 4 to 12 word pairs; after each list their memory is tested by presenting one word from 
each pair, and they are asked to reproduce the other element. Upon exploring the data, B notices an 
unanticipated pattern: When participants confuse the correct word with a word from another pair in 
the memory list, it is more likely to be a pair close to the correct one in the presentation order than 
one further away. After some reading and discussion with colleagues, B finds out that this regularity 
is predicted by a class of episodic-memory models in which the temporal context of events acts as an 
important retrieval cue for the events, such as SIMPLE (Brown et al., 2007) and TCM (Sederberg, 
Howard, & Kahana, 2008).  
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Researcher A did everything by the books to claim that she did confirmatory research. In 
contrast, researcher B made his discovery through exploratory research, and could be accused of 
HARKing when claiming to have obtained empirical support for temporal-context theories of 
memory. Yet, we argue that the evidence supports the theory in question more strongly in Scenario 
B than in Scenario A.  
We designed Scenario A to fit the blueprint of discovery-oriented research: The inferential 
link between the theory and the expected effect is weak; it requires a number of questionable 
auxiliary assumption to be turned into a deductive link: "If EPT is true, and if the concept of a 'leap of 
faith' is embodied in the physical action of jumping over a gap, and if jumping over a gap once primes 
that concept for at least a few minutes, and if priming that concept shifts people's responses on a 
questionnaire towards higher religiosity scores, then the experimental group will show higher 
religiosity scores (Xa)".  Each of the auxiliary assumptions could fail, so that failure to observe "xa" 
(i.e., obtaining a non-significant group difference in religiosity scores, or even a Bayes factor strongly 
in favor of the null hypothesis) does not count as evidence against EPT, whereas observing "xa" 
counts as evidence not only for EPT but also for all auxiliary assumptions. For the same reason, 
P(X|EPT) is arguably low, and as we have shown above, that implies that P(Xa|"xa") is not very high 
either.  
In contrast, we regard Scenario B as a typical case of theory-testing research: The class of 
temporal-context theories of episodic memory (TCTs) logically entails the hypothesis that events 
closer together in time are more likely to be confused with each other than events more separated in 
time (Xb). No auxiliary assumptions are needed to arrive at that implication. Therefore, P(Xb|TCT) = 1. 
Moreover, TCTs have received substantial empirical support so far, so that their current prior, P(TCT), 
is reasonably high. Together, these two probabilities imply that the posterior probability P(Xb|"xb") is 
high, too: The finding "xb" is unlikely to be a false positive. Therefore, observing "xb" provides strong 
evidence for Xb, and by implication for TCTs. Conversely, failure to observe "xb" (assuming strong 
statistical power, or a convincing Bayes factor in favor of the null) counts as evidence against TCT. 
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This is so whether or not researcher B carried out the experiment with the purpose of testing TCTs. 
The intention and insight of B does not matter – it could be that B is so dense that he never realizes 
the connection between his finding and TCTs, but a smarter colleague notices it, re-analyzes B's data, 
and publishes the result. The scientific community does not need to know about the history of mind 
of B and his colleague to appreciate that the data support TCTs.  
Philosophers have proposed several solutions to the paradox of predictivism, which have in 
common that they assign no evidential value to temporal order per se. Rather, they regard temporal 
order as a proxy for something else that distinguishes impressive cases of successful a-priori 
predictions of as yet unknown empirical generalizations from unimpressive successful post-hoc 
explanations of known empirical generalizations (Barnes, 2008; Snyder, 1994). What is this 
"something else"? A post-hoc explanation is vulnerable to the suspicion that the theorist designed 
the theory so that it explains the known phenomena, cobbling together just the right assumptions 
that are needed to arrive at the correct set of hypotheses. An a-priori prediction does not attract that 
suspicion because the theorist, not knowing which prediction will turn out to be true, could not 
design the theory to fit the findings. Another way to put the difference – first proposed by Keynes 
(Barnes, 2008) – is this: When a theorist develops a theory T, and that theory successfully predicts a 
novel finding X, then the theorist must have good reasons to propose T that do not involve knowing 
X. These reasons could be other, already known empirical phenomena Y1, Y2, … Yk that the theory 
explains, and/or theoretical reasons R1, R2, … Rm such as the plausibility of the theory's assumptions 
in light of what we know, or the theory's simplicity and elegance. Hence, when X is later confirmed by 
observation, theory T is supported not only by X but also by all Y and/or all R. In contrast, when a 
theorist designs a theory T that explains a known phenomenon X, then it is possible that knowledge 
of X is the only good reason for the theorist to propose T, and hence, X is the only support for T.  
These considerations narrow down the "something else" underlying our intuition that a-
priori predictions are preferable to post-hoc explanations: When a theory T implies a hypothesis X, 
and evidence establishes X credibly, then this provides more support to T the more strongly T is 
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justified independently of X. Independent justification means that there is a rational argument 
towards T that does not involve X as a premise – whether or not that argument accurately reflects 
the theorist's thought process (Ladyman, 2002). That is, even if a theorist had knowledge of X while 
constructing T, if that construction is based on good reasons without using knowledge of X, then X 
may strongly support T notwithstanding the reversed temporal contiguity.  
The degree of independent justification arguably correlates with the distinction between a-
priori and post-hoc, but crucially, it is not necessarily tied to it. We can think of extreme cases of 
trivial post-hoc explanations, in which a theorist designs a new theory such that it explains a single 
known phenomenon X, and the theory has no other justification than its ability to explain X. But 
then, the history of science offers numerous counterexamples to the correlation: Cases in which a 
theory provides a first explanation for a long-known phenomenon, although the theory was not 
designed for that purpose at all.5  
For the complementary counterexample to the correlation, we can think of cases in which a 
theory, designed arbitrarily without any justification, successfully predicts X a-priori by sheer luck. 
This is arguably very unlikely – but a much more likely case is this: A theory motivates a large, 
perhaps infinite, number of predictions in the manner we delineated as characterizing discovery-
oriented research (for instance, all the different ways of testing embodiment priming). Most of these 
predictions will fail, but a few of them might turn out to be true, and these successes would receive 
the credit of successful a-priori predictions (perhaps formally established through preregistration). 
We argue that such credit would be unjustified, because the predictions receive only weak 
justification from the theory: For each of these predictions, the theory does not imply that they will 
be true but only that they can be true, and P(X|T) is fairly low for each individual prediction. In other 
words, the rare prediction successes must be seen in the context of the many prediction failures, 
where the experiments "did not work". The a-priori nature of a successful prediction is only a proxy 
                                                            
5 A famous example is the explanation of a known anomaly in the orbit of Mercury by Einstein's general theory 
of relativity.  
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for the prediction having a strong independent justification, or for some inherent quality that 
empowers the theory to make successful predictions. But if there is no strong justification, and if the 
predictive power of a theory is quite modest in light of its many predictive failures that accompany 
the few successes, then that proxy is invalid. Even preregistration does not make it more valid.6  
Preregistration and "Researcher Degrees of Freedom" 
So what is the point of preregistration? Preregistration serves to reduce "researcher degrees 
of freedom" (Simmons et al., 2011); that is, researchers’ choices among large sets of equally 
defensible hypotheses to test, and analysis plans to test them. Within the classical framework of null-
hypothesis testing – still the dominant statistical approach in psychology – uncontrolled researcher 
degrees of freedom have been argued to entail an uncontrolled inflation of Type-I error rate due to 
multiple testing (de Groot, 1956/2014). Independent of the statistical framework chosen – classical 
null-hypothesis testing or Bayesian statistical inference – researcher degrees of freedom open the 
door to inadvertent biases when researchers choose hypotheses or analysis paths (e.g., choices 
about data pre-processing and statistical model) that lead to a desired result (Wagenmakers et al., 
2012).  
We have no doubts that preregistration does curtail researcher degrees of freedom, and as 
such it serves an important purpose in preventing a number of fallacies in scientific inference. At the 
same time, we think that preregistration, when applied mechanically – preregistering hypotheses 
and analysis plans chosen with little concern about their justification –remains a cure of the 
symptoms rather than a solution addressing the roots of the problem. Therefore, we want to ask: 
Where do the excessive researcher degrees of freedom come from, and can we do something to 
reduce them systematically rather than through an arbitrary decision that we privilege by uploading 
it on a preregistration repository?  
                                                            
6 If the preregistrations are automatically and obligatorily made public, then at least the research community 
gets to know about the context of prediction failures.  
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Researcher degrees of freedom arise on both levels of scientific inference (Figure 1). On the 
empirical level they arise because we have a multitude of data transformations and data analytical 
tools at our disposal that are often equally justifiable. On the theory level they arise when theories 
can be used to motivate a large number of hypotheses – perhaps even contradictory hypotheses – 
equally well. We argue that on both levels there are more principled solutions than preregistration of 
an arbitrary choice, but the solutions for the two levels differ, so we will discuss them separately. We 
begin with a consideration of the problem of Type-I error inflation through multiple comparisons in 
null-hypothesis testing. After that we will address the more general problem arising from researcher 
degrees of freedom, namely the room they create for inadvertent bias. We will first discuss solutions 
to this problem on the empirical level, concerning the selection of data-analysis paths, and then on 
the theory level, concerning selection of hypotheses to test.  
Preregistration and the Problem of Multiple Comparisons. When researchers do not determine 
their hypotheses and their analysis plans before looking at the data, they will usually test multiple 
possible hypotheses (e.g., every possible pairwise correlation between n variables), and test each 
hypothesis through multiple possible analysis paths, thereby carrying out multiple tests (de Groot, 
1956/2014). This is problematic in the context of null-hypothesis significance testing: When the Type-
I error for each test is set to α, the chance of committing at least one Type-I error – erroneously 
rejecting a true null hypothesis – increases beyond α with multiple tests. As the number of tests 
researchers choose from is usually unknown, there is no way to correct for this error inflation. 
It is useful to distinguish two cases of multiple testing (Rubin, 2017a), which correspond to 
our distinction between inferences on the empirical level and the theoretical level. Case 1 is the 
situation where a researcher tests the same hypothesis through multiple analysis paths, and is willing 
to reject the null hypothesis if at least one analysis path results in a significant outcome. This case 
concerns the exploitation of researcher degrees of freedom on the empirical level. It leads to an 
inflation of the Type-I error rate for the hypothesis under investigation – this has become known as 
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"p-hacking". Replacing null hypothesis testing by Bayesian statistics does not circumvent this 
problem: Running multiple analyses testing the same hypothesis, and selecting the one yielding the 
highest Bayes Factor for one's preferred hypothesis, inevitably biases the conclusion. Under both 
statistical approaches, preregistration of analysis plans can avoid this bias because it reduces the 
number of tests to one.  
Case 2 is the situation where a researcher tests multiple hypotheses, testing each of them 
with only one analytical approach (e.g., running a standard significance test on each of 100 
correlation coefficients). This scenario does not lead to an inflated Type-I error rate for each 
individual hypothesis. It does increase the chance of committing at least one Type-I error among all 
hypotheses tested, and as such it increases the Type-I error rate for the "joint null hypothesis" (de 
Groot, 1956/2014), which states that all individual hypotheses tested are false. But the joint null 
hypothesis – or its negation, the claim that "at least one of the n alternative hypotheses tested is 
true" – is rarely of scientific interest.  
Testing a large, unconstrained number of hypotheses, as in Case 2, can still be problematic, 
but the problem does not arise from an inflated Type-I error rate on the hypotheses tested. The 
problem arises if the researcher goes on a "fishing expedition", searching through a large hypothesis 
space with few constraints from theory or prior findings. This is the scenario arising from discovery-
oriented research: In the absence of strong predictions from a theory, researchers have large 
degrees of freedom on the theory level, that is, freedom to choose from a large set of hypotheses 
through HARKing. The problem with HARKing is that the hypotheses usually have a low prior, P(X|T) 
(Dienes, 2011).  
The distinction between the two cases is made transparent within a Bayesian approach to 
inference, which distinguishes between the prior of a hypothesis and the evidence in the data for 
that hypothesis (as expressed, for instance, in the Bayes factor). Case 1 – the exploitation of 
researcher degrees of freedom in data analysis – compromises the assessment of the evidence. Case 
2 – exploiting degrees of freedom in hypothesis selection – implies low priors of the hypotheses. 
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Classical null hypothesis testing has no place for priors and therefore tends to obscure the difference. 
A significant p value arising from HARKing in a discovery-oriented context can easily be 
misinterpreted as providing as much credibility (i.e., posterior probability) to a hypothesis as a 
significant test supporting a hypothesis derived from a theory in theory-testing research, when in fact 
the former should be far less convincing than the latter. To address that problem, classical 
statisticians often recommend treating Case 2 in the same way as Case 1 and correct for multiple 
testing (with paradoxical consequences pointed out by O'Keefe, 2003). Preregistration of hypotheses 
can then be seen as a way to limit the number of tests. From a Bayesian perspective, Case 2 should 
be addressed by assigning low priors to hypotheses.  
To bring the difference between the two approaches to Case 2 into focus, consider Scenario 
C: Researcher C1 runs an EEG study to find out how the brains of researchers react differently to 
significant vs. not-significant p values. She determines that the effect of p-value significance on 10 
dependent variables obtained from the EEG data is of interest (e.g., the N200, the P300, the 
posterior alpha power, etc.), and preregisters these 10 hypotheses. Therefore, she needs to correct 
her alpha level for multiple testing. Researcher C2 is interested in the same hypotheses but takes a 
more wasteful (though smarter) approach: He runs the same experiment 10 times, each time 
preregistering only one of the 10 hypotheses, and thereby evades the correction for multiple testing. 
The same data that lead to a significant result in favor of, say, an effect of p-value significance on the 
P300 for C2 could fall short of being significant for C1, thereby influencing how credible we find this 
hypothesis after considering the data. A Bayesian approach would treat both researchers' 
experiments in the same way, considering the priors for each hypothesis. These priors should depend 
on how strongly each hypothesis follows from a theory, and not on how many hypotheses a 
researcher plans to test in the same data set (Dienes, 2011). The role of preregistration in the 
Bayesian approach is to make researchers think about their priors without being biased by the data, 
but the act of preregistration a hypothesis does not increase its prior, and therefore has no impact on 
its posterior.   
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We next consider alternatives to preregistration as tools to manage researcher degrees of 
freedom, first for the empirical level, and subsequently for the theory level.  
From Data to Empirical Generalizations: Degrees of Freedom in Analysis Plans. There are plenty of 
sources of researcher degrees of freedom on the empirical level of scientific inference – from data to 
empirical generalizations – and much has been written about them. The "garden of forking paths" 
(Gelman & Loken, 2014) includes decisions about data selection (e.g., which variables, or which 
observational units, to include in the analysis), data pre-processing (e.g., whether or not to transform 
response times logarithmically), and about which statistical analysis procedure to use. Because our 
methodological toolbox for most research problems is already large, with a tendency to grow fast, 
researchers often face a situation where several alternatives at each forking point are equally 
justifiable (for an example see Silberzahn et al., 2018). Choosing among these options depending on 
their outcomes invites biases in favor of choosing an analysis path that yields the researchers' 
preferred conclusion, or an outcome likely to be publishable.  
If there are multiple analysis paths that are equally justifiable for achieving a goal of 
statistical inference (e.g., testing a given hypothesis), then the optimal solution is to run all equally 
justifiable analyses and record to what extent they converge on the same results. When the number 
of options is too large to run them all, one can still run a sample of different analysis plans (similar to 
a sensitivity analysis; Thabane et al., 2013). The degree of convergence provides information about 
the robustness of the results against variation of analytic choices that should not matter. This 
approach is nicely illustrated by the "multiverse" analysis of Steegen, Tuerlinckx, Gelman, and 
Vanpaemel (2016), who investigated the robustness of inferences from a data set across a multitude 
of data pre-processing decisions. Our proposal is to generalize this approach to other decisions in the 
analysis pipeline (e.g., concerning outlier treatment, statistical model to be tested, inclusion of 
independent variables and co-variates, etc.). This multiverse analysis circumvents the problem of 
Type-I error inflation because the researcher no longer draws conclusions from a single test chosen 
according to its outcome, but from all tests run.  
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Compare that gold standard to preregistering one analysis plan, and regarding that plan only 
as providing strong, "confirmatory" evidence (Nosek, Ebersole, DeHaven, & Mellor, 2018). If there 
truly are, before looking at the data, several equally justifiable analysis plans, then choosing one of 
them for preregistration is arbitrary. It engenders the risk that this one way of analyzing the data 
happens to miss an interesting pattern that would be revealed by, say, 90% of all other equally 
justifiable analysis plans. By sticking to the preregistered plan, we will never find out. Departing from 
that plan, however, would mean that we officially enter "exploratory" territory, and the outcomes 
would carry less weight in the minds of researchers who focus on preregistration as a sign of quality 
– in fact, within the framework of null-hypothesis testing, the exploratory analyses have no evidential 
value concerning the hypothesis under investigation at all (de Groot, 1956/2014).  
To illustrate, consider Scenario D in which Researcher D anticipates that for her experiment 
there are 50 a-priori equally defensible data analysis paths, and she decides to preregister one of 
them, chosen by a random draw. After analyzing the data according to the preregistered procedure, 
she continues to run the remaining 49 analysis plans as "exploratory". Assume that the preregistered 
analysis yields evidence in favor of X, and of the 49 exploratory analyses, a percentage ε yields 
evidence against X. What percentage ε would convince you to trust the exploratory analyses more 
than the “confirmatory” preregistered one? Should the preregistered analysis really carry more 
weight in the balance of evidence than each of the other 49? Readers who think yes might consider 
the following variant of this scenario: A team of 10 researchers D1 to D10 plan a large study together. 
They each independently preregister an analysis plan that they choose at random from the 50 
equally justifiable options. When the data are in, each of them runs all 50 analyses on the same data, 
and—necessarily—arrives at the same mixture of results: Some analyses support X, others support 
the null hypothesis. Because for each team member a different analysis plan counts as confirmatory, 
and thereby receives higher weight, they are likely to come to different conclusions about what the 
data imply for hypothesis X. The only reason for their discrepant conclusions is a series of coin tosses.  
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To conclude, preregistering analysis plans curtails researcher degrees of freedom, and this is 
an important safeguard against bias. However, preregistration of one analysis plan chosen arbitrarily 
from a set of equally justifiable alternatives remains an arbitrary choice, and does not receive a 
privileged status of evidential force through preregistration per se. Preregistration is a public record 
of the mental history of the researcher, and the history of the researcher's reasoning process has no 
bearing on the rationality of their decisions (see our earlier discussion of the "paradox of 
predictivism"). If a researcher chooses an analysis method that is inappropriate, or biased in favor or 
against one hypothesis, then preregistering this method does nothing to mitigate these deficiencies. 
Therefore, giving the results of preregistered analyses more weight in evaluating a hypothesis than 
the results of equally reasonable but not preregistered analyses would be a mistake.  
We believe that the following alternative is more defensible: When faced with a garden of 
equally justifiable forking paths, walk down a sample of them that covers the garden with reasonable 
breadth, and report how consistent the findings are. In addition, make the raw data publicly available 
so that other researchers who doubt your conclusions can run any alternative analysis plan to check 
the robustness further. One could, of course, preregister the entire intended multiverse of analyses, 
but if the multiverse spans the space of reasonable options—as it should—then preregistration adds 
nothing. In summary, preregistration of one analysis path negates the advantage of a multiverse 
analysis by privileging one arbitrarily chosen approach; preregistering the entire multiverse adds 
nothing because, by design, a multiverse analysis is dealing with researcher degrees of freedom 
already. 
We say this not to discourage our colleagues from preregistering analysis plans. To the 
contrary, we believe that preregistration is useful as an explicit stage in the research process, 
dedicated to considering which data pre-processing and analysis paths are reasonable and justifiable. 
It is also a very useful exercise to keep one's own hindsight bias under control, because what appears 
reasonable and justifiable to us after analyzing the data tends to be biased by the results. 
Preregistration thus serves as a tool to overcome our psychological shortcomings, and we should 
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embrace this protective function. Following a single pre-registered analysis plan is clearly more 
reasonable and rigorous than running an analysis in multiple ways and cherry-picking the one that 
works in one's favor for publication. But like all useful tools, preregistration is not without limitations, 
and it is crucial that researchers are aware of those limitations. An important limitation to recognize 
is that preregistration of an analysis path does not change the logical status of the results arising 
from that analysis path. Limiting ourselves to one single way of looking at the data as the one that 
counts for making inferences, and downgrading all other analyses as "exploratory", risks replacing a 
self-serving bias by a blind bias. Giving equally justifiable analysis approaches equal weight, as in a 
multiverse analysis, overcomes that limitation.   
From Theories to Hypotheses: Degrees of Freedom in Hypothesis Selection. Large degrees of 
freedom for HARKing arise naturally from discovery-oriented research. Much of psychology is 
characterized by theories that are so vague that they do not strongly imply any hypothesis without a 
host of auxiliary assumptions. These auxiliary assumptions are not constrained by the theory and can 
therefore be chosen in any way that suits the researcher. When hypothesizing after the results are 
known, researchers can choose the auxiliary assumptions in such a way that the hypothesis matches 
the result. To illustrate, we noted earlier in our example involving embodiment priming that the 
prediction for an experiment involving religiosity might involve a deductive chain such as "If EPT is 
true, and if the concept of a 'leap of faith' is embodied in the physical action of jumping over a gap, 
and if jumping over a gap once primes that concept for at least a few minutes, and if priming that 
concept shifts people's responses on a questionnaire towards higher religiosity scores, then the 
experimental group will show higher religiosity scores (Xa)." Upon finding no significant effect on 
religiosity, the researcher could freely hypothesize that any of the auxiliary assumptions might be in 
need of revision: For example, the gap may have primed the idea of a “leap of faith”, as postulated, 
but that type of faith may be unrelated to the arguably more fundamental faith in a supreme being, 
and rather pertain to the more mundane faith in other people. The researcher could then proceed to 
test the new hypothesis that participants in the experimental group had more faith in the 
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trustworthiness of the experimenter, and therefore were more likely to sign a post-experimental 
consent form agreeing that a video recording of their behavior could be used for further research.  
These degrees of freedom are much curtailed in theory-testing research. Take, for instance, 
theories of recognition memory. There is a long-running debate between proponents of two families 
of theories: On the one side there are theories assuming that recognition decisions are made by 
evaluating whether a signal from memory that varies on a continuum of strength exceeds a criterion, 
as formalized in signal-detection theory (Wixted, 2007). On the other side are theories assuming that 
recognition decisions arise from two or three discrete mental states: A detect state (remembering 
that the probe has been experienced as part of the relevant memory set) resulting in an "old" 
response, a guessing state (not remembering anything about the probe) resulting in an uninformed 
guess of "old" or "new", and (in some theories) a second detect state (remembering that the probe 
was not in the memory set) resulting in a "new" response (Bröder & Schütz, 2009). Recently, Kellen 
and Klauer (2014, 2015) have derived hypotheses from the two classes of theories by which they can 
be distinguished, and these hypotheses follow from the core assumptions of the theories alone, 
without auxiliary assumptions. In this way, Kellen and Klauer reduced the degrees of freedom for 
hypothesizing to zero.  
To conclude, researcher degrees of freedom in formulating hypotheses can be more or less 
constrained by the theories from which they are derived. On one end of the continuum, which we 
described as theory-testing research, hypotheses are strongly implied by theories with little, if any, 
flexibility arising from varying auxiliary assumptions or parameter values. Preregistering these 
hypotheses makes their a-priori character explicit but does not add anything substantive, because 
the hypotheses follow from the theories no matter when, or whether, a researcher thinks of them. In 
other cases, which we described as discovery-oriented, hypotheses are merely motivated—rather 
than strongly entailed—by theories, and therefore researchers have many degrees of freedom to 
vary them. An even more extreme case at that end of the continuum is a search for empirical effects 
not guided by any theory, motivated perhaps by practical questions (e.g., asking whether students 
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learn better when lecturers make jokes), or just as a fishing expedition (e.g., asking whether any of 
37 personality scales that happen to be available for a large sample predicts a person's sexual 
orientation, or asking which of > 100 cortical areas' BOLD signal correlates with people's report of 
subjective awareness of a stimulus). These are the cases that give researchers huge leeway for 
HARKing, and that have given HARKing its bad reputation: When the results are known, inventive 
researchers can always come up with a plausible story explaining why the results had to come out 
exactly as they did.7 Preregistration of hypotheses can curtail that practice – but then, which 
hypotheses could a researcher preregister when no hypothesis is strongly implied by any theory? A 
researcher engaged in discovery-oriented research or a fishing expedition would have to place a 
blind bet on a prediction to preregister. If that prediction turns out to be true, it would still be 
nothing but a lucky guess – it looks like strong support for the researcher's theoretical claim but it is 
not. There is no reason to expect future predictive success from a theory supported by lucky guesses 
– just as there is no reason to expect that a stock broker who was lucky on the stock market 5 times 
in a row is a financial genius who can out-smart the market.  
So what is the value of preregistering hypotheses? Like with preregistration of analysis plans, 
we see its main benefit in controlling our biases. It motivates researchers to think about what they 
predict for a study, and about how, and how strongly, their prediction is actually justified by the 
theory that motivates it. When the argument from theory to prediction is thought through before 
seeing the data it cannot be biased by the data. Preregistration of hypotheses therefore reassures us 
and our colleagues that our reasoning is unbiased – it does not, however, replace such reasoning. 
Preregistering a hypothesis without providing a reason for it is pointless, and does nothing to 
increase the credibility of the hypothesis even if it happens to be supported by a study's finding.  
                                                            
7 Of course jokes improve learning: They increase alertness. Of course, jokes impair learning: They distract from 
the material to be learned. Of course jokes have no effect: Students don’t listen to instructors, period. 
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Towards Stronger Theories: Formalization and Computational Modelling 
We have argued throughout this article that the development of strong theories – with a 
tight logical link between theoretical assumptions and hypotheses derived from them – goes a long 
way towards addressing the replication crisis. We now consider in more detail what it means to 
develop strong theories. 
As the example of recognition theories mentioned above (Kellen & Klauer, 2014, 2015) 
illustrates, deductive derivation of a hypothesis is greatly facilitated when theories are formalized as 
a set of equations or propositions. We can then use mathematical analysis or formal logic to 
determine what hypothesis does or does not follow from the theory, and where that is too difficult, 
we can use simulation to derive hypotheses unambiguously. Sometimes, formalizing a theory and 
investigating it through simulation can help uncover that a hypothesis a theorist had thought to 
derive from their theory actually does not follow from the assumptions of the theory; occasionally 
even the negation of the original hypothesis follows (for examples see Lewandowsky & Oberauer, 
2015; Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2014). This possibility gives rise to a further illuminating scenario, 
Scenario E: Researcher E develops a well spelled-out theory T and argues that the theory entails a 
novel prediction X. After preregistering that prediction (and the analysis plan), E carries out an 
empirical study that provides strong evidence for X. Subsequently, another researcher formalizes the 
assumptions of T, and demonstrates through simulation that T cannot generate the effect pattern X. 
The conclusion must be that the successful prediction of X (whether or not it was preregistered) 
counts as evidence against T.  
Free Parameters and Arbitrary Assumptions. Formal modelling helps to determine what 
hypotheses are entailed by a theory, but it does not by itself solve the problem of degrees of 
freedom about hypotheses. Many formal models have considerable flexibility in what data patterns 
they generate. This flexibility has two sources. One source is the flexibility inherent in any formal 
model, arising from the model's free parameters in conjunction with its functional form. This source 
of flexibility is being intensely studied in the field of statistics concerned with model selection (Pitt, 
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Myung, & Zhang, 2002), and increasingly sophisticated methods are being developed to take model 
flexibility into account when determining which model gives a better account of some data (Shiffrin, 
Lee, Kim, & Wagenmakers, 2008).  
One way to keep this first source of model flexibility in check is to constrain the values of free 
parameters, either by making theoretical assumptions about plausible parameter values or by 
drawing on prior empirical knowledge. In classical statistical methods of model fitting (e.g., 
maximum-likelihood methods), such constraints can only be set in a hard way by placing upper and 
lower bounds on parameter values, or fixing parameters to a single value. For instance, modelers 
often require some parameters to remain invariant across applications of the model to different data 
sets (so-called "universal free parameters" according to Wills & Pothos, 2012). Within a Bayesian 
framework, constraints on parameter values can be incorporated in informative priors on parameters 
(Lee & Vanpaemel, 2018). Informative prior distributions can implement soft constraints by 
concentrating probability mass on the most plausible parameter values while still assigning some 
prior probability to a broad range of less plausible values. A principled empirical way of determining 
priors is to use the posteriors of parameter values from one data set as the priors on these 
parameters for the next data set (Kary, Taylor, & Donkin, 2016). Doing this successively is likely to 
progressively narrow the priors, thereby reducing the parameters' freedom to vary. In this way, 
empirical certainty is accumulated over a series of studies, but they don't need to be direct 
replications of each other, they just need to re-use (in part) the same free parameters. We can think 
of the parameter estimates carrying over from previous model applications as a form of 
preregistration of parameter values – but one that constrains parameters in a principled way 
informed by data.  
A second source of flexibility lies with the decisions that researchers make when building a 
formal model.  Once these decisions are made, they are hard-wired into the model -- we can think of 
them as preregistered in the model equations (Muthukrishna & Henrich, 2019). Yet, they are degrees 
of freedom at the model-development stage (Farrell & Lewandowsky, 2018; Chapter 2). Assumptions 
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built into a formal model vary in the degree to which they are justified by theoretical considerations 
independent of the empirical generalizations the model is built to explain.  
Take, for example, resource models of visual working memory. Several models in this class 
are built on the basic idea of a sample-size model (Palmer, 1990). The core assumption is that visual 
working memory has a limited number of units for coding visual features (e.g., colors, line 
orientations); each unit codes a visual feature with a limited degree of precision, and when multiple 
units redundantly code the same feature, the information from these units is averaged when that 
feature needs to be retrieved. These assumptions mathematically imply that the precision of the 
retrieved feature (expressed as the standard deviation of report, σ, or sensitivity, d', in recognition 
tests) increases with the square root of the number of units redundantly coding it – in the same way 
as the standard error of an estimated mean decreases with the square root of the sample size of a 
study. With the additional assumption that, when multiple visual objects are held in working 
memory, they share the available feature-coding units, this class of resource models makes a precise 
prediction for how memory precision σ declines as memory set size n increases (Bays & Husain, 2008; 
Sewell, Lilburn, & Smith, 2014; Smith, Lilburn, Corbett, Sewell, & Kyllingsbæk, 2016). This prediction 
is expressed by a power function: 
 
At this point, some models in this class include the assumption that the exponent can differ 
from 0.5, and therefore the constant is replaced by a free parameter (Bays & Husain, 2008; van den 
Berg, Shin, Chou, George, & Ma, 2012). This free parameter gives the model extra flexibility and 
enables a better account of the data. However, it turns the power function from something that 
follows from the theory's core assumptions into a convenient choice of a mathematical function for 
describing the effect of set size on memory precision (Oberauer & Lin, 2017).8  
                                                            
8 Recently, resource theorists have addressed this conundrum in two ways. Smith, Corbett, Lilburn, and 
Kyllingsbæk (2018) have shown that the freely estimated exponent increases with more attention-demanding 
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Our argument is this: Researchers are free to make decisions when building a formal model, 
but not all such decisions are equally justifiable. If we carefully scrutinize how well model 
assumptions are justified – by the theoretical ideas they intend to formalize, by their degree of 
coherence and integration with the rest of the model, by their convergence with assumptions in 
other empirically successful models, or by empirical knowledge outside the set of phenomena that 
the model is built to explain (e.g., knowledge about how individual neurons work constraining neural-
network models of behavior; see O'Reilly & Munakata, 2000) – we can reduce the researcher degrees 
of freedom for building models.  
Does Formal Modelling Exaggerate the Replication Problem? Whereas we believe that 
formal models of psychological processes are part of the solution to curtail researcher degrees of 
freedom in hypothesizing, Fiedler (2017) argues that they are part of the problem. Fiedler points out 
two weaknesses of formal models. First, models consist of a number of very specific assumptions 
about psychological mechanisms and processes. This degree of specificity – precisely the 
characteristic that licenses strong inferences to hypotheses – entails that the prior probability of a 
model being true is low: For the model to be true, each of its assumptions needs to be true, and the 
more specific each assumption is formulated, the more alternatives it excludes, which reduces its 
prior probability of being true. If the prior of a model is low, then the prior of every hypothesis 
deduced from it is low, too. Therefore, Fiedler argues, formal process models are ill suited to lead the 
way to highly replicable findings. The second weakness Fiedler points out is that the confirmation of 
hypotheses derived from models is often not diagnostic – other models incorporating entirely 
different assumptions may entail the same hypotheses.  
Fiedler's second argument partially neutralizes his first: If a hypothesis X is necessarily 
implied not only by a model T1 but also by at least one other model T2, then the prior of the 
hypothesis, P(X), is already larger than the prior of that model, P(T1). For instance, consider two 
                                                            
Berg and Ma (2018) abandon the notion of a constant resource and instead propose that the resource amount 
assigned to memory representations follows a regime of rational cost-benefit analysis.  
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mutually exclusive models T1 and T2, each of which imply the same hypothesis X. In this case, P(X) is 
the sum of P(X|T1) * P(T1) and P(X|T2) * P(T2); if the hypothesis follows deductively from each theory, 
the two conditional probabilities are both one, and P(X) is the sum of the two model priors, P(T1) + 
P(T2). More generally, the hypotheses implied by a model are often not unique to that model – they 
are usually also implied by other, similar models, and often also by other models starting from 
entirely different assumptions. Hence, even if the prior of each individual model is, on average, very 
small, the priors of the hypotheses entailed by them are not necessarily small. They are small if the 
hypothesis is unique to the model under investigation, but larger to the extent that other models 
also imply the same hypothesis. When other models imply the same hypothesis, confirming the 
hypothesis as an empirical generalization does not uniquely single out one model as the winner, but 
it is still informative as it reduces the set of viable models.  
The situation is different from discovery-oriented research, where the link between theory 
and hypothesis is weak, meaning that P(X|T) is low for each testable hypothesis X. If X is to have 
confirmatory diagnosticity for T (i.e., confirming X is to be counted as support for the theory), then 
P(X|¬T) has to be substantially smaller still – in other words, the hypothesis has to be bold, and 
evidence for it must be surprising. This is why the prior of a hypothesis X is necessarily small in 
discovery-oriented research. By contrast, in theory-testing research, and in particular when testing 
formal models, P(X|T) is very high – in the ideal case, when the hypothesis follows deductively from 
the theory or model, it is unity – and therefore P(X|¬T) can be fairly high, too, without confirmation 
of X losing its diagnostic value for T. In our numerical examples we set P(X|¬T) to 0.2. In the context 
of testing competing computational models against each other, we can interpret this value as saying 
that, among those (known and not yet known) models that are alternatives to T (our current model 
of interest), there are some that also imply X, and the sum of their priors is 0.2. This implies that the 
prior of the hypothesis, P(X), is larger than 0.2. To conclude, Fiedler's claim that the prior probability 
of a hypothesis derived from a formal model is necessarily low is disconfirmed by his own recognition 
that multiple models may make the same prediction. 




Figure 2: Effects of continuously varying the strength of the inferential link from theory to hypothesis, 
P(X|T). Left: Prior probability of the hypothesis, P(X), and posterior probability of the hypothesis in 
light of confirming ("x") or disconfirming ("not x") data. Right: Posterior probability of theory, given 
confirming or disconfirming data. The red horizontal line demarcates the prior of the theory. 
Probabilities are calculated with the equations and parameter values given in Table 2.   
 
A second point, neglected in Fiedler's critique, is that empirical tests of formal models – and 
theory-testing empirical research in general – afford symmetric evidence: Data confirming a 
hypothesis X provide evidence in favor of any theory or model that implies hypothesis X, but at the 
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and provides more credibility to those competing theories or models that imply the negation of X. In 
other words, each test of X is also a test of ¬X, and therefore we should care as much about the prior 
of ¬X as about the prior of X. As noted above, to the extent that P(X) is large, P(¬X) = 1-P(X) is small. 
Therefore, Fiedler's (2017) recommendation to maximize P(X) – for instance by deriving hypotheses 
from necessary statistical truths – although doubtlessly addressing the problem of non-replicable 
findings, is not the best way forward for gaining knowledge on the level of theories. When taken to 
an extreme, it leads to tests of hypotheses that are trivially true, and confirming them is largely 
uninformative. Arguably, the ideal hypothesis is one that is entailed by about half of the credible 
models in an area (i.e., those models with a non-negligible prior), such that the hypothesis' prior is 
around 0.5. In this way, whichever outcome of an empirical test is obtained – confirming or 
disconfirming the hypothesis – the result cuts the set of remaining credible models in half.   
Conclusion: Remedies for the Theory Crisis in Psychology 
We need to reduce researcher degrees of freedom on both levels of scientific inference. On 
the empirical level, we propose that researchers check the robustness of their inferences against 
variations of analysis decisions that are equally justifiable, and that they make their raw data publicly 
available whenever possible (see Lewandowsky & Bishop, 2016, for boundary conditions) so that 
others can continue checking their robustness. On the theory level – our primary concern in this 
article – there are two paths towards reducing researcher degrees of freedom. One is to do 
discovery-oriented research, but do it right. Researchers on this path accept that the current state of 
theorizing in their field does not license strong inferences to hypotheses, and that as a consequence, 
their hypotheses usually have a lower prior probability. The implication is that large sample sizes 
and/or direct replications are needed to establish a new empirical generalization with a satisfactory 
level of credibility. The other path is to do theory-testing research. Researchers on this path make an 
effort to formulate their theories as precisely as possible, thereby strengthening the inferential link 
from the theory to the hypotheses derived from it. Expressing the theory formally is likely to help in 
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this endeavor. This path de-emphasizes the need for direct replication and favors successive tests of 
different hypotheses. 
We acknowledge that some sub-disciplines of psychology have a longer tradition of formal 
modelling to build on than others, and therefore theory-testing research might appear to be out of 
reach for many psychological scientists. We do not want to downplay the difficulties of formulating a 
precise theory that enables strong inferential links to hypotheses. At the same time, we argue that 
researchers can always make steps towards formulating their theoretical ideas more precisely, and 
even formally. A formal theory does not need to spell out mechanism and processes in much detail – 
formal models exist on various levels of abstraction. A formal model could simply consist of a path 
diagram making explicit the monotonic causal links that are assumed between two or more 
continuous variables, or a Bayesian network (Glymour, 2003) making explicit the probabilistic 
dependencies between discrete variables. Developing such a model would involve identifying and 
explicitly incorporating assumed moderator variables, boundary conditions, and other auxiliary 
assumptions. Often theorists hesitate making these additional assumptions explicit because there is 
so much uncertainty about them that fixing them would come down to an arbitrary guess. The way 
forward in these cases would be to incorporate uncertainty into the model. The Bayesian modelling 
framework is ideally suited for that purpose: Uncertainty is incorporated through priors. Usually 
priors are placed on quantitatively varying free parameters, expressing our degree of uncertainty 
about the quantity in question. However, we can use priors also to express uncertainty about 
qualitatively different choices in building a model – for instance, the choice between different 
functional forms for the relation between two variables (i.e., the relation could be linear, or 
exponential, or a power function, ...). The prior would then be a probability distribution over a set of 
discrete options in the model. Uncertainty about model assumptions can be expressed explicitly and 
formally, implying that uncertainty is not the same as vagueness about model assumptions. The 
former is no excuse for the latter.  
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We end by revisiting the Embodiment Priming Theory that we used as an example for the 
kind of theory that often motivates discovery-oriented research, and ask what it would take to 
transform this theory into one that guides a theory-testing research program. Figure 6 presents a 
blueprint for the core causal model of EPT. At its center is the assumed embodied representation of a 
selected concept C. This concept is assumed to be activated by an unknown subset of possible bodily 
states or movements. That subset is unknown because the theory does not specify how C is 
embodied; there is arguably a large set of possible embodiments of a concept, of which only one is 
true for each person, so for each possible experimentally induced bodily state or movement there is 
an unknown, probably small, probability that it activates C. The concept C, when activated, is 
expected to influence a subset of possible judgments, decisions, and actions that are semantically 
related to C. Again, there is a vast set of such behaviors that could be chosen as dependent variables, 
and the theory does not specify which of them will be affected by activating C, so the probability for 
each of them being activated is unknown, and perhaps small. Finally, the concept can be expressed 
linguistically. Assuming that researchers identify C linguistically, and that they come from the same 
linguistic community as the population they investigate, the linguistic expression is highly likely to be 
understood by the study participants as referring to C, so we can assume a high probability that the 
linguistic expression "C" activates C.  
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Figure 6: Core causal structure of Embodiment Priming Theory. A set of bodily states or movements B1 
to Bn is considered as plausible manifestations of the embodied representation of concept C, such that 
experimentally inducing Bx activates (primes) C. Each Bx has a probability P1(x) of actually priming C. A 
set of observable behaviors is considered as dependent variables DV1 to DVn. If C is primed, it 
influences each DVx with probability P2(x). The linguistic expression "C" activates C with probability P3. 
The figure includes plausible priors for the probabilities P1, P2, and P3; the priors of P1 and P2 were 
chosen so that the expected value of P(X|EPT) = P1 x P2 = 0.1, in agreement with the numerical 
example for discovery-oriented research in Table 2 and the text.  
 
With this admittedly highly simplified formalization of EPT in place, we can consider two 
research programs for testing it. The first implements discovery-oriented research but is heeding our 
recommendations for this kind of pursuit. For a given concept of interest (e.g., "faith"), the 
researchers would select one experimentally induced bodily state or motion (e.g., leaping over a gap 
in the floor) and one dependent variable that could be influenced by priming the concept (e.g., the 
score on a religiosity questionnaire) in an unprincipled manner (e.g., by discussing in a lab meeting 
how an experiment on the embodiment of a "leap of faith" could be done in an inexpensive way). 
They run a first experiment with acceptable power (1-β = 0.8). If that experiment yields evidence for 
the predicted effect, they follow it up by a direct replication, perhaps with even more power. If 
things go well, and if the experiments conform to the empirical recommendations made earlier (e.g., 














P1(1) ~ Beta(1,4) 
P1(6) ~ Beta(1,4) 
P2(1) ~ Beta(3,3)
P2(6) ~ Beta(3,3)
P3 ~ Beta(10,1) 
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to jump over a gap in the floor increases their scores on a religiosity test (taken within a certain time 
window)".  
The second research program implements theory-testing research. The researchers would 
recognize that EPT does not offer a strong inferential link to a prediction for any individual 
combination of an experimentally induced bodily state or movement with a dependent variable. 
However, if the formalization of EPT includes a commitment to at least moderately informative priors 
about the probabilities P1 and P2, the theory does license a strong prediction for a representative 
sample of the population of bodily states and movements that could embody the concept, combined 
with a representative sample of potentially affected outcome variables: The prediction is that about 
P1 x P2 such combinations will produce a true effect. Testing this prediction presents several 
challenges, the least of which is the large number of necessary experiments (a collaborative effort 
across many labs could overcome that hurdle). Researchers have to first clarify the population of 
possible bodily states and movements that could, with some plausibility, embody the concept in 
question, and assign it a distribution of prior probability. The same would have to be done for the 
population of behaviors plausibly affected by priming the concept, which could be used as 
dependent variables. Then a representative sample from both populations needs to be drawn to 
arrive at a set of experiments. By representative we mean: Representative for the population of 
experimental situations and behaviors we want to generalize the theory to. Assuming that that is the 
population of situations and behaviors occurring in people's everyday lives, our proposal converges 
with what is known as Brunswikian experimental design (Freund & Isaacowitz, 2013; Gigerenzer, 
Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991). The experiments need to be analyzed jointly – the relevant statistical 
inference question is not whether any individual experiment shows a true effect, but whether the 
sample of measured effects supports a model assuming a proportion of P1 x P2 true effects in the 
population over a model with 0 true effects. Such a model comparison could turn out either way, and 
therefore, this empirical test has a chance to provide strong support in favor, but also against the 
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theory – as we demonstrated above, this symmetry of possible conclusions is a hallmark of theory-
testing research that distinguishes it from discovery-oriented research.  
The theory-testing research program sketched above obviously far exceeds the discovery-
oriented research program in the amount of conceptual effort and data-collection resources it 
requires. But then, we get much more in return: If supported by the evidence, EPT would be 
supported not merely by one randomly chosen – albeit firmly established – empirical generalization, 
but by findings in a representative sample of possible experimental tests of the theory, which allows 
generalizing the theory to the population of situations and behaviors it is meant to apply to. The 
positive findings in that sample could be considered conceptual replications of each other with 
respect to EPT. Because the result of our hypothetical mega-study consists of the joint outcome of all 
experiments in the sample, there is no leeway for selectively publishing the subset of studies that 
"worked". None of the positive findings in the sample of experiments would be confirmed through 
direct replication, so we will not know whether any individual effect is true. Does it matter? That 
depends on what we ultimately want to know: Whether leaping over a gap in the floor raises scores 
on a religiosity test – or whether EPT captures something true about how the mind works? In other 
words: Is the goal of our science to establish empirical generalizations, or to work towards better 
theories?  
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